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THE  INTRACTABILITY  OF  QUALIFIED  IMMUNITY
Alan K. Chen*
INTRODUCTION
The federal common law doctrine of qualified immunity, a key feature
of American civil rights law, protects public officials from damages lawsuits
unless their conduct violates “clearly established . . . constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”1  The Supreme Court
designed the doctrine to strike a balance between the desire to permit indi-
viduals to enforce their constitutional rights by suing government officials for
damages and the need to alleviate the perceived burdens on those officials
and the government in responding to such claims.2  As the rich body of liter-
ature3 in this area illustrates, qualified immunity presents fascinating and
complex legal theory questions.  At the same time, disputes about its proper
implementation reflect its enormous significance for practitioners in routine
civil rights litigation.  Indeed, it is fair to say that the doctrine has now puz-
zled, intrigued, and frustrated legal academics, federal judges, and litigators
for half a century.4
This Essay offers an internal critique of qualified immunity law that
explains why these problems remain intractable and why, unfortunately,
there is little hope for resolution of the doctrine’s central dilemmas, short of
either abandoning immunity or making it absolute.5  The Essay breaks down
its discussion of qualified immunity into three distinct, but related, catego-
ries, and argues that the challenges presented within each category are diffi-
© 2018 Alan K. Chen.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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1 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
2 Id. at 813–14.
3 See infra notes 23–24.
4 Qualified immunity’s origins can be reasonably traced to the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555–57 (1967).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 17–19.
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cult, if not impossible, to overcome.  First, it addresses what can best be
described as qualified immunity’s foundational jurisprudential tensions.
Embedded in the doctrine are several first-level legal theory problems that
can be identified and discussed, but for which there are ultimately no “right”
answers.  These tensions can be seen, for example, in the operationalization
of the doctrine as an open-ended reasonableness standard rather than a
bright-line rule, the conceptual challenge of distinguishing pure questions of
law from mixed questions of law and fact, and the appropriate level of gener-
ality at which “clearly established constitutional rights” are articulated.
Indeed, as the latter question suggests, the very meaning of constitutional
rights underlies all conversations about qualified immunity.
These theoretical and doctrinal tensions are, in turn, translated into real
practical challenges for judges and litigators, especially at the federal district
court level, who struggle to implement a doctrine that suffers from serious
administrability problems.  Among these problems are continuing disputes
over the degree to which discovery is permissible prior to resolving immunity
claims, the coherent implementation of supposedly transsubstantive sum-
mary judgment procedures, and the continuing consumption of substantial
resources by the adjudication of qualified immunity claims.
Finally, the Essay addresses qualified immunity from a public policy per-
spective, arguing that meaningful reform of the doctrine is impeded in part
because of these previously identified tensions, which as suggested are not
amenable to easy resolution.  Reform is also made more difficult because of
insurmountable epistemological problems about how the doctrine operates
on the ground.  Notwithstanding the emergence of excellent, recent empiri-
cal work by several legal scholars, the doctrine likely will remain entrenched
in its current form because of the Supreme Court’s reluctance to consider
empirical data in revising rules of constitutional enforcement coupled with
Congress’s lack of political will.  The legal community can continue to argue
about qualified immunity at the margins, but should not reasonably expect
any transformation of the doctrine’s basic structure over its next fifty years.
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY LAW
Damages claims against public officials are an important, though by no
means the only, aspect of our constitutional enforcement scheme.6  Such
actions permit plaintiffs to be compensated for their injuries and deter pub-
lic officials from engaging in unconstitutional conduct.  For a number of rea-
sons, constitutional tort claims became more widely available throughout the
1960s and 1970s.7  This expansion in the number of claims generated
6 Such claims may be brought against most state and local officials pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), and against federal officials under the authority of Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392–97 (1971) (recogniz-
ing damages actions against federal officials in their personal capacity for the violation of
Fourth Amendment rights).
7 This was the product of a number of different factors, including the expansion of
the meaning of under color of state law in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL505.txt unknown Seq: 3 30-JUL-18 14:42
2018] the  intractability  of  qualified  immunity 1939
increasing concerns that many of these lawsuits were frivolous and that
defending them imposed both societal and individual costs.
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court identified three categories of
such costs.  First, it found that imposing financial liability on officials who
might not understand the nuances of constitutional doctrine, particularly
when most are not legally trained, would be unfair.8  Second, the Court
argued that officials would hesitate when required to act if they were con-
cerned that their actions could subject them to a lawsuit, thus creating a
problem of “overdeterrence.”9  Finally, the Court found that, although offi-
cial defendants could still prevail on the merits, even being subject to the
burdens of the judicial process would cost them time, distract them from
their jobs, and require them to incur litigation expenses.10
Thus, before having to defend a constitutional tort claim on the merits,
official defendants could assert qualified immunity as an affirmative defense.
The process for adjudicating qualified immunity claims was heavily dictated
by the Court’s identification of the problems with constitutional tort suits.
To avoid the burdens of litigation, the Court established a procedure that it
believed would allow disposition of immunity claims at the earliest possible
stage of litigation.  Thus, the Court suggested that defendants could seek res-
olution of their qualified immunity claims on summary judgment and that
trial courts should not permit discovery prior to deciding such claims.11
Though the Court has had to back away from that approach somewhat, as
discussed below, the immunity issue is basically designed to be resolved well
before trial.
The Court has also specified the appropriate legal standard for resolving
qualified immunity claims.  It directed that:
[T]he judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable
law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action
occurred.  If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could
not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments,
nor could he fairly be said to “know” that the law forbade conduct not previ-
ously identified as unlawful. . . . If the law was clearly established, the immu-
other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978), application of
constitutional rights provisions to state and local governments through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s incorporation doctrine, see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(extending use of the exclusionary rule to state courts), and the recognition of a damages
action against federal officials for constitutional violations, Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392–97. See
generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.2 (6th ed. 2012) (citing statistics
about the rapid growth in § 1983 litigation after Monroe). But see Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pic-
tures and Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. REV. 889 (2010)
(arguing that through a number of different doctrinal moves the Court has substantially
diminished the scope of constitutional enforcement since Monroe).
8 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319–22 (1975).
9 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806–07 (1982).
10 Id. at 814.
11 Id. at 818.
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nity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public
official should know the law governing his conduct.12
Thus, qualified immunity operates essentially as an ignorance-of-constitu-
tional-law defense for public officials, though that defense does not apply if
the law is clearly established.
Moreover, the Court’s decisions establishing qualified immunity as a fed-
eral common law defense have, for all intents and purposes, been unani-
mous.13  Though the Court has decided numerous qualified immunity cases
in the past decades, the basic structure of the doctrine is unchanged.14
Rather than providing substantive development that advances the under-
standing of this area of the law, many of the Court’s decisions in recent years
merely tinker at the margins of the doctrine15 or summarily reverse lower
court decisions that are not, in its view, sufficiently protective of public offi-
cials.16  Thus, the essential architectural features of qualified immunity law
have remained quite stable, which is why the analysis in this Essay focuses on
doctrine as fundamentally shaped in Harlow.
While the Court’s explanations of the policy and procedure for applying
qualified immunity seem reasonable on the surface, the law’s implementa-
tion reflects substantial theoretical and pragmatic tensions that have
remained problematic.  As I discuss below, this is because these issues are
largely embedded in the doctrine’s architecture, making them not only prob-
12 Id. at 818–19 (footnote omitted).
13 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).  Justice Douglas dissented in Pierson,
but not on the qualified immunity issue. Id. at 558 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
judges should not be entitled to absolute immunity).  Chief Justice Burger dissented in
Harlow, but on the ground that the President’s closest aides should be protected by abso-
lute, rather than qualified, immunity. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 822 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
14 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM
L. REV. 479, 494 (2011) (observing that the qualified immunity standard “has remained
relatively untouched in recent decades” since the Court’s decision in Harlow).  The only
major change to the doctrine since Harlow has been the short-lived requirement that
courts decide the merits question before addressing the immunity question, with the hope
that this would result in greater development of the substantive law. See Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).  For an argu-
ment that qualified immunity and constitutional innovation can coexist in a post-Pearson
world, see James E. Pfander, Essay, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional
Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601 (2011).
15 See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (holding that plaintiffs need not iden-
tify precedents with materially similar facts to demonstrate that the law was clearly estab-
lished); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) (holding it improper for courts to
impose heightened evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in unconstitutional motive cases where
the defendant asserted qualified immunity on summary judgment); Richardson v.
McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (holding that guards employed by private companies oper-
ating prison under contract with the state may not assert qualified immunity).
16 Karen Blum, Qualified Immunity: Time to Change the Message, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1887 (2018) (noting that many of the Court’s recent immunity decisions are per curiam
summary reversals of lower court decisions denying officials qualified immunity); see also
Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 62, 63 (2016).
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lematic, but also intractable.  What follows is an internal critique of the doc-
trine’s design and administrability.  By internal critique, I refer to critical
analysis of the doctrine’s structure within the parameters of its basic prem-
ises.17  That is, my arguments take the legitimacy of the doctrine’s premises
at face value, but maintain that the doctrine creates substantial internal ten-
sions and may sometimes even undermine its own goals.  In contrast, others
might level different sorts of external critiques.  One example of an external
critique might be from a Critical Legal Studies perspective: namely, that the
doctrine is really just an instrumental tool to protect powerful government
actors while providing the illusion that citizens can enforce their constitu-
tional rights.18  A very different type of external critique could be that the
doctrine cannot be understood wholly internally because it is simply one
piece of a larger question about the optimal scheme of constitutional
enforcement.  Two prominent and thoughtful expositors of this latter exter-
nal critique are Richard Fallon and John Jeffries, who have frequently
reminded us that qualified immunity must be assessed and critiqued not in
isolation, but against the broader matrix of constitutional enforcement
mechanisms.19  These observations about immunity scholarship are quite
insightful, and in other work I have followed that lead.20  For the purposes of
the present analysis, however, my critique remains for the most part internal,
while acknowledging that immunity law is but a part of a larger remedial
structure.
II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY’S FOUNDATIONAL JURISPRUDENTIAL TENSIONS
H.L.A. Hart would have loved qualified immunity.  One could easily
imagine that his famous illustration of legal rules through a hypothetical “No
Vehicles in the Park” ordinance might today be supplanted by a philosophi-
cal examination of what counts as a “clearly established constitutional
right.”21  Had his Supreme Court nomination been confirmed, Robert Bork,
in turn, would likely have considered qualified immunity to be a main course
in his “intellectual feast.”22  Indeed, qualified immunity has captured the
17 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 279–90 (1978).
18 For general background, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
(1987).
19 See Fallon, supra note 14; John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts,
99 VA. L. REV. 207, 208 (2013); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law,
Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991).
20 See Chen, supra note 7, at 889 (suggesting that “examining the existence and opera-
tion of alternative constitutional remedies across different contexts offers important
insights about the architecture of federal constitutional enforcement”).
21 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125–27 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds.,
2d ed. 1994). See generally Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109 (2008).
22 Responding to a Senator asking why he wanted to be on the Supreme Court, Judge
Bork stated that “it would be an intellectual feast,” 1 Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings on S.1011 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 854 (1989), which critics used to suggest that he would be
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attention of a significant number of legal scholars and been the focus of
some of the richest federal courts scholarship of the past generation.23  An
equally impressive new generation of scholarship, many of whose authors are
contributing to this issue, is rapidly emerging.24
It is no wonder that legal theorists have been captivated by qualified
immunity.  It is, as Winston Churchill once famously said of Russia, “a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”25  This is so because qualified
immunity has presented us with several foundational jurisprudential ques-
tions that are in part responsible for the seemingly endless confusion about
its application and effectiveness.  From a theoretical perspective, these
choices present interesting questions about what it means for a public official
to violate a person’s constitutional rights, or what rights mean under an
immunity regime.  In addition, there is a certain amount of path dependency
associated with the Court’s decisions about these issues.  The choice to articu-
late qualified immunity as a standard rather than a rule, to define it as a
question of law rather than a mixed question of law and fact, and to identify
(but not really address) the proper level of generality at which a clearly estab-
lished right is stated, have all had serious effects on the doctrine’s adminis-
trability.  That is, the problems identified in this Part led inevitably to the
problems discussed in Part III.
A. Standards over Rules
There are three possible approaches to immunity for public officials in
constitutional tort cases.  First, we could have no immunity at all; defendants
in each case could defend themselves on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim
that they violated the Constitution (as, of course, they are still entitled to do
highly proficient technically, but ultimately lacking in compassion and sensitivity. See Law-
rence C. Marshall, Intellectual Feasts and Intellectual Responsibility, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 832, 833
n.6 (1990).
23 See, e.g., David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach
and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497 (1992); Karen M. Blum, Qualified
Immunity: A User’s Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187 (1993); Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litiga-
tion: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913 (2015); Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 19; John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts,
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115; Jeffries, supra note 19; John C. Jeffries, Jr., Essay, The Right-Remedy
Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999); Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section
1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597 (1989); Sheldon H. Nahmod,
Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies: Executive Official Immunity, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 221
(1984); David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activ-
ism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23 (1989).
24 See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 46
(2018); Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405 (2012); Aaron L. Nielson & Chris-
topher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2015); Alexander A.
Reinert, Screening out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191 (2014);
Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2 (2017).
25 THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 152 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).
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under present law if they are found not to have any immunity).26  Second,
there could be absolute immunity for all officials in all cases.  That is, we
could simply abolish constitutional tort actions.  The Court has already estab-
lished that some officials, such as judges, prosecutors, and legislators, are
entitled to absolute immunity, at least when they are carrying out the central
functions of those offices.27  These first two categories would be bright-line
immunity rules.  In contrast, the Court has chosen a third path, articulating
qualified immunity as an open-ended legal standard.  As we will see, that deci-
sion embedded many of the principal difficulties with the doctrine.
The dilemma of whether legal directives should be articulated as cate-
gorical rules or broad standards is an age-old topic of legal theory.
A rule is a legal directive that is relatively precise and dictates a determi-
nate result based on the existence of certain predetermined factors. . . . In
contrast, a standard is a relatively open-ended directive that defines broad
criteria under which a decisionmaker may draw a conclusion in a particular
case, depending upon how and to what extent the criteria are satisfied in
those circumstances.28
A full elaboration of the debate is well beyond the scope of this Essay,
but each form of legal directive is widely understood to have both virtues and
flaws.29  At the risk of vastly oversimplifying the discourse, hard rules are said
to offer more predictability and constrain decisionmakers’ discretion by lim-
iting their ability to make arbitrary or biased decisions, while softer standards
are supposed to provide more fairness and substantive equality by allowing
decisionmakers to be flexible and account for individual circumstances in
their decisions, promoting greater justice.30  Standards also, in theory, pro-
mote accountability of decisionmakers by requiring them to explain in detail
the reasons for their decisions.31
26 Qualified immunity would have to be abolished if it is unlawful, as Professor Baude
has suggested, Baude, supra note 24, though other doctrines and rules might take its place
to address the policies it is understood to advance.
27 In reality, the universe of possibilities is slightly larger.  For example, all officials
might be permitted to assert qualified immunity in some circumstances (e.g., when sued
for making decisions they have no time to deliberate over) but not others.  Or, as I suggest
below, the law might grant absolute immunity to some categories of officials and no immu-
nity to others.  For the purposes of developing this framework, I bracket these possibilities.
28 Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional
Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 282 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
29 For background reading in this area, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 15–63 (1987); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMI-
NATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Pierre Schlag,
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); see also Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory
Lexicon: Rules, Standards, and Principles, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Sept. 6, 2009, 9:40 AM),
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/09/legal-theory-lexicon-rules-standards-
and-principles.html.
30 See Chen, supra note 28.
31 See id. at 291.
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Implementation of a standard by definition requires case-by-case adjudi-
cation of each application of the law, and this is certainly true of qualified
immunity.  The Court’s decision to articulate qualified immunity as a stan-
dard “seems to be supported by a classic argument for standards: its open-
ended nature empowers the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant
considerations,”32 thereby promoting substantively just outcomes.
Of course, standard-like immunity directives are subject to the conven-
tional critiques of standards as well. . . .  A decisionmaker with a decidedly
pro-government bias can recharacterize virtually all constitutional violations
as within the realm of what a “reasonable official” might have thought to be
legal.  The expected response to this critique, however, would be that the
qualified immunity standard forces the decisionmaker to explain the reasons
for his decision, thus promoting a discussion of relevant factors and expos-
ing the decision to scrutiny after-the-fact.33
Thus, the qualified immunity standard can be seen as promoting sub-
stantive justice in the form of individualized decisionmaking and delibera-
tion, as well as accountability for decisionmakers.  These would seem to
comport with the stated policy goals of qualified immunity to protect officials
who make reasonable, but mistaken, judgments about the constitutionality of
their conduct, while allowing plaintiffs to pursue claims for officials’ egre-
gious unconstitutional acts.
But there are also unseen consequences to the standard-like qualified
immunity test.  When courts apply the qualified immunity standard to consti-
tutional directives that are also articulated as standards, such as the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness test, it undermines the benefits of articulating
substantive constitutional doctrine in the form of standards, which are that they
also promote deliberation, fairness, and accountability.34  But when the
immunity standard is stacked on top of the liability standard, those benefits
may be lost.  As I have described this phenomenon, “[t]he qualified immu-
nity standard creates a layer of balancing that occurs before the deci-
sionmakers ever reach the substantive deliberation of constitutional doctrine.
With the decisionmaking process one step removed from the substantive
standards, the deliberation that occurs under the immunity standard is over
immunity balancing, not over constitutional questions.”35
The doctrinal consequence of this stacking is that none of the values we
associate with substantive constitutional standards are advanced.36  Fairness
for the parties is supposed to be achieved through context-specific decisions
about whether the Constitution has been violated.  Deliberation about that
decision has intrinsic value and also makes judges accountable for their deci-
sions in either direction.  But immunity balancing replaces constitutional bal-
ancing, thus altering the liability determination, obscuring deliberation
32 Id. at 293.
33 Id.
34 See id. at 307–19.
35 Id. at 316–17.
36 There are practical consequences as well, which are discussed infra Part IV.
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about the underlying substantive decision, and insulating judges from
accountability for their constitutional decisions (by allowing them to explain
that even if the official violated the plaintiffs’ rights, immunity considerations
preclude the case from proceeding to the merits).37
This is a serious challenge to defending qualified immunity, particularly
in an age when constitutional doctrine is usually articulated in the form of
balancing tests.  The challenge might be addressed by one type of rule-based
immunity that divided public officials into two categories, one protected by
absolute immunity and the other having no immunity.  For example, one
could make the argument that law enforcement officers have greater access
to legal training and advice from legal counsel, and should therefore be
expected to have a stronger understanding of the law than other public offi-
cials, such as school teachers.  Accordingly, we might imagine a system in
which law enforcement officials would have no immunity and teachers would
enjoy absolute immunity.  Under that structure, the distorting effect of
immunity decisions would not arise.  Suits against teachers would be dis-
missed and litigation against police officers would be adjudicated on the mer-
its.  In that scenario, the underlying substantive constitutional standards that
apply to the police would be applied in each case, serving the goals of individ-
ualized determinations and articulated reasoning of judges’ decisions, which
constitutional standards are supposed to promote.
In the absence of bifurcating immunity in this way, the problem of
immunity balancing appears to be inherent under any regime in which
immunity is “qualified.”  There is really no other manner in which immunity
could be implemented without turning to absolute immunity or abolishing
immunity altogether.  The former would eliminate all constitutional tort
actions, which directly conflicts with the constitutional enforcement scheme
endorsed by Congress (§ 1983) and the Court (Bivens).  The latter would
devalue the Court’s concerns about fairness, overdeterrence, and social costs,
at least in the absence of major overhauls to constitutional tort law, such as
making government employers strictly liable for their employees’ constitu-
tional torts.38
37 For a much more elaborate description of this complex issue, see Chen, supra note
28, at 309–19.
38 Or perhaps no reform is needed at all, because as Joanna Schwartz has persuasively
demonstrated, police officers are routinely indemnified for their official actions.  Joanna
C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 936 (2014) (“Between 2006 and
2011, in forty-four of the seventy largest law enforcement agencies across the country,
officers paid just .02% of the dollars awarded to plaintiffs in police misconduct suits.”).  If
this were true for all public officials, many of the arguments in favor of qualified immunity
would disappear. See Fallon, supra note 14, at 497 (“[I]t might be desirable to reconsider
current doctrines that largely shield governments from direct liability for their officials’
wrongs, especially if empirical studies were to establish that government employers rou-
tinely indemnify their officials anyway.”).  One scholar has argued, however, that even if
indemnity is widespread, qualified immunity is justified by a distinct public policy ratio-
nale.  Larry Rosenthal suggests that immunity allows government employers to limit the
expenditure of resources on training and supervision of individual officials to ensure com-
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The standards over rules question is not intractable in the sense that the
law could be no other way.  As suggested earlier, qualified immunity could be
articulated as a bright-line rule.  But then it would no longer be qualified.
Thus, the adoption of this open-ended legal standard is embedded in the way
in which the Court thinks about qualified immunity––as a vehicle for early
disposition of constitutional tort cases.
B. Questions of Law over Mixed Questions of Law and Fact
A key to the Supreme Court’s development of constitutional tort law has
been its unbending insistence that the issue of qualified immunity––whether
an official’s conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known––is a pure question of law.39  Of
course, this determination is essential to the Court’s procedural framework,
which demands that trial courts resolve immunity claims on summary judg-
ment.40  It is the reason the Court directs trial courts to deny discovery
before resolving immunity claims.  It is a central premise to the Court’s rul-
ing that public officials whose qualified immunity claims are denied by the
trial court may seek an interlocutory appeal even though that ruling is not a
final judgment.41  It is also a completely unrealistic understanding of how the
doctrine operates on the ground in the vast majority of cases.42
pliance only with clear and established legal rules.  Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Govern-
mental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797,
856–57 (2007) (“Given the expense and uncertain efficacy of training and supervision
directed at unsettled questions of constitutional law, it is doubtful that the diversion of
scarce public resources from other public purposes toward endeavoring to minimize errors
in these unsettled areas of law—or toward the payment of judgments and other legal costs
when a court concludes that a public official has erred in such a context—is justifiable.”).
As I argue in Part V infra, there are limits to the value of additional empirical research on
qualified immunity as a basis for reform.
39 See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515–16 (1994); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  This was not always
the case.  Prior to its decision in Harlow, the Court sometimes referenced the need for a
factual record to determine an official’s entitlement to qualified immunity. See Alan K.
Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in Constitu-
tional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 33–36 (1997).  Moreover, this was not exclusively
because the test prior to Harlow required examination of the official’s subjective good
faith. Id. at 33 (“The central difficulty with Harlow’s approach is that it obscures the inher-
ent role that facts play in all qualified immunity claims, not simply those involving an
inquiry into subjective good faith.”).
40 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
41 See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524–26 (applying the collateral order exception to trial
court decisions denying qualified immunity).
42 As the Court has recognized, in cases involving a fundamental factual dispute about
whether an incident ever occurred, it is impossible to resolve the immunity claim. See
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 316–17 (1995) (rejecting interlocutory appellate jurisdic-
tion on a qualified immunity claim when the parties disputed the factual issue of whether
defendants even touched the plaintiff).
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Qualified immunity’s application requires the determination of whether
a reasonable public official, at some point in the past, would have understood
her conduct to have violated a plaintiff’s “clearly established” constitutional
right.43  As I have observed in my prior work:
[A]ll qualified immunity inquiries are inevitably fact-dependent, at least in
part, because the reasonableness of a government official’s conduct must be
evaluated with reference to some set of facts.  Courts can assess whether a
particular act violates a “clearly established” right only by comparing the
existing case law to an undisputed description of that act.  Entitlement to
qualified immunity, therefore, must be viewed as a mixed question of law
and fact.44
To be sure, there are some circumstances in which qualified immunity
can be resolved as a pure legal question, as when the plaintiff asserts a fanci-
ful claim to a previously unrecognized right that is patently frivolous—such
as a plaintiff who claims that a police officer’s denial of her request for pea-
nut M&M candies during interrogation violated her right to due process.
Setting aside such cases, which are presumably quite rare, facts are virtually
always an essential prerequisite for adjudicating qualified immunity.  Because
most constitutional rights, again, are articulated as general open-ended stan-
dards, the post hoc assessment of whether they have been violated during a
particular interaction between the public official and a citizen necessitates
application of the law to some set of facts.
Admittedly, the fact-dependency problem may be less acute when immu-
nity claims are addressed and resolved at the pleading stage, rather than on
summary judgment.  There, the courts are obliged to accept the plaintiff’s
allegations as true, and determine the applicability of qualified immunity
based on those sets of facts.  But that only circumvents the problem of which
set of facts to examine, not the dilemma that fact disputes, fairly evaluated,
should often preclude qualified immunity resolutions.  First, at the pleadings
stage, it may be possible for plaintiffs to plead facts sufficient to avoid an early
immunity determination.45  Second, because the adjudication of constitu-
tional rights frequently requires multifactored, context-specific analysis,
many constitutional claims are likely to involve complex fact scenarios that
require the disputes to last well past the pleading stage.
The Court’s treatment of qualified immunity as a legal question under-
scores the difference between an adjudication on the merits and the disposi-
tion of an immunity defense.  Judicial resolution of any type of legal claim
43 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
44 Chen, supra note 39, at 6–7 (footnote omitted).
45 This may be more possible in some contexts than others. See Schwartz, supra note
24, at 24.  At one point, lower courts attempted to address this barrier to early resolution by
imposing heightened pleading standards in civil rights cases.  Chen, supra note 39, at
79–82.  Though the Court initially appeared to reject that possibility, see Leatherman v.
Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), its more
recent cases have demonstrated skepticism about the notice pleading standard more
generally.
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requires a mixture of legal and factual analysis.  Constitutional rights are no
different.  Each instantiation of a right takes place with a predetermined set
of background legal principles, which are then applied to the circumstances
of a case as determined by a fact finder.  Qualified immunity technically sepa-
rates the right (whether the official violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights) from the remedy (whether the official’s conduct violated clearly estab-
lished rights of which a reasonable person would have known).  This move
allows the Court to identify the latter question as a purely legal one because
its resolution occurs in a pretrial procedure rather than at trial.  But, for the
reasons I have already stated, this is nothing but jurisprudential sleight-of-
hand.46  Even the Court has implicitly conceded the conceptual problems
with its position, declaring qualified immunity to be an “essentially legal
question.”47
Like the standards/rules question, the Court’s declaration that qualified
immunity is a pure question of law is not the only path to crafting the doc-
trine.  The Court could properly identify qualified immunity as a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact.  But doing so would be in serious tension with its explicit
goals of early disposition and its choice of summary judgment as the proper
procedural vehicle for doing so.
C. Narrower over Broader Levels of Generality
Even taking at face value the legal fiction that qualified immunity is a
pure question of law, the doctrine faces a third legal theory problem related
to how the parties and the court frame the legal right at issue.  To determine
whether an official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional
right, there must be an actual articulation of that right.  But as the Court has
acknowledged, the level of generality at which that right is stated will materi-
ally alter the qualified immunity determination.48
Defining a clearly established right requires a close examination of pre-
cedent, but previous judicial decisions may articulate the right that is being
enforced in broad or narrow terms.  Broad statements of the law are
unhelpful in this context.  A prior holding that “warrantless searches of draw-
ers in a private office violate the Fourth Amendment in the absence of exi-
gent circumstances” gives very little context by which to judge later police
conduct.  Does it matter whether the police officer was legally present in the
office in the first instance?  Or whether the search was being conducted pur-
suant to a lawful arrest at that office?  What about whether the drawer, or for
that matter, the room in which the drawer was located, was locked?  Whether
the police were searching for drugs or a ticking bomb?  Because of the num-
46 As I have previously argued, this is part of a larger project by the Court to alter
ordinary summary judgment procedure to facilitate early termination of qualified immu-
nity claims by allocating decisionmaking to judges instead of juries.  Alan K. Chen, The
Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 262–67 (2006).
47 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis added).
48 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
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ber of potential factual variables, in applying the holding from the precedent
to a later case in which an officer is sued for damages after conducting a
warrantless search, it is difficult to determine whether the later officer vio-
lated a clearly established constitutional right.
A broad statement, such as the hypothetical holding described above,
would establish the right at such a broad level of generality that virtually all
searches of office drawers would violate a clearly established right.  As Justice
Scalia observed in Anderson v. Creighton:
[I]f the test of “clearly established law” were to be applied at this level of
generality, it would bear no relationship to the “objective legal reasonable-
ness” that is the touchstone of Harlow.  Plaintiffs would be able to convert
the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of
virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely
abstract rights.49
And, of course, the right could be stated at even broader levels of
abstraction that would have the same effect, as in “it is clearly established that
police officers may not violate the Fourth Amendment,” or “it is clearly estab-
lished that no public official should violate the U.S. Constitution.”
Conversely, if the precedent is read as establishing the right at a very
narrow level of generality, the law will rarely if ever be clearly established.  A
precedent that says that “when a police officer lawfully enters a private office
with the owner’s consent and engages in a warrantless search of unlocked
drawers in pursuit of a small packet of cocaine and there is strong reason to
believe that evidence will be destroyed by the search’s subject if the police do
not act immediately” defines the clearly established right only in a narrow set
of cases with parallel facts.  If that is the level of generality at which we under-
stand constitutional rights to be defined, few if any searches will ever violate
clearly established constitutional rights because each search will present the
courts with a unique set of factual circumstances.  The Court expressly does
not require that rights be defined this narrowly, either.50
The same issue presents itself with defining rights in many other areas of
constitutional doctrine.  Take, for example, a constitutional tort claim on
behalf of an executed prisoner’s estate challenging a botched execution by
lethal injection as a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause.  Assuming that the officials responsible for the execu-
tion assert qualified immunity, stating the established right at a broad level of
generality would offer them no protection, because all officials should be on
notice that the Constitution clearly establishes a right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment.  But stating the right at a narrow level of general-
ity, given the sheer number and combination of factors that can affect a
49 Id.
50 See id. at 640.
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lethal injection execution, would mean that the law can never be clearly
established, meaning that the plaintiff’s estate could never prevail.51
While the Court has shown that it is aware of this dilemma, it has none-
theless done little to clarify the appropriate level of generality at which the
clearly established right must be articulated.  Indeed, its attempts at address-
ing this are patently incomplete and unsatisfactory.  Looking again to its deci-
sion in Anderson, the Court stated:
[O]ur cases establish that the right the official is alleged to have violated
must have been “clearly established” in a more particularized, and hence
more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.  This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immu-
nity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but
it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
apparent.52
If we conceptualized narrow and broad articulations of a right on a con-
tinuum, it would not be possible to identify precisely how far along on that
spectrum the “contours of the right” would be sufficiently clear such that
immunity does not attach.  The problems with this unresolved dilemma are
manifest.  If the idea of qualified immunity is to put public officials on rea-
sonably fair notice of what conduct clearly violates the Constitution,
instructing them that they must understand the “contours” of a right is
uniquely unhelpful.  The same goes for federal judges who are adjudicating
qualified immunity claims.
To be sure, the Court has tried to further refine the Anderson contours
test, but not in enlightening ways.  In Hope v. Pelzer,53 the Court reviewed a
§ 1983 claim by an inmate who alleged that prison guards violated his consti-
tutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when they twice
handcuffed him to a hitching post, once for a period of seven hours, provid-
ing him with very little water and no bathroom breaks.54  The Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit based on the guards’ qualified
immunity claim, reasoning that relevant precedents must not be mere
“abstractions,” but must be “materially similar” to the circumstances of the
case at hand.55  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the caselaw that
puts officials on notice that their conduct is unconstitutional need not
involve materially similar facts, but that officials are expected to understand
that fairly analogous factual scenarios can clearly establish the law and that
the reasoning of relevant precedents can help define the contours of the law
51 See, e.g., Estate of Lockett ex rel. Lockett v. Fallin, 841 F.3d 1098 (10th Cir. 2016).
The author discloses that he was one of the lawyers representing the plaintiff in the appeal
in this case.
52 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
53 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
54 See id. at 733–35.
55 Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 981 (11th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
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even where the specific holdings do not.56  Although the Court’s decision in
Hope might provide some clarification of what constitutes clearly established
constitutional rights, it is not sufficiently precise in defining where on the
narrow/broad continuum the qualified immunity standard should be
located.  It is a decision that provides a relative, but not absolute, answer to
the levels of generality question.
But not only is the Court’s guidance unhelpful for defendants and
judges, it also leaves open the possibility that judges will apply the Anderson
contours standard in a manner that is heavily influenced by their own norma-
tive values about what officials ought to know and when they ought to be
held accountable.  This underscores the standard-like nature of qualified
immunity, and may lead to highly inconsistent decisionmaking, perhaps even
more so than if these judges were permitted to decide such cases on the
merits rather than through the abstraction of the qualified immunity doc-
trine.  Moreover, even in an ideal world, we could not hope for a more spe-
cific answer to the levels of generality problem, because that is in the nature
of defining not rights, but whether and when the law considers those rights
to be clearly established.  As long as qualified immunity is articulated under
the Harlow standard, this problem will persist.
* * *
As I discuss next, not only are these three legal theory problems intracta-
ble, but they also dictate the adjudication of the doctrine by courts and liti-
gants and create a distinct set of implementation challenges.
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY’S ADMINISTRABILITY PROBLEMS
If qualified immunity has been a legal theorist’s dream, it has been a
nightmare for litigators and judges who confront its implementation on a
routine basis.  Precisely because the Court has (at least putatively) resolved
the previously discussed jurisprudential issues in the manner described, it has
produced a body of law that creates serious administrability problems.  That
is, the problems identified in this Part are highly path dependent because
they are a product of the Court’s doctrinal choices discussed in the previous
Part.  These are problems most likely to be experienced at the trial level, and
the Supreme Court either has no idea that the structure it has put in place
creates these problems or chooses to willfully disregard them.57  Indeed, ask
56 Hope, 536 U.S. at 742–43; see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
57 At a Federal Judicial Center training on qualified immunity that I taught for federal
trial judges and magistrates several years ago, I noted that none of the Justices on the
Supreme Court at that time had experience as a trial judge, an observation that I specu-
lated had at least some impact on the poor formulation of the qualified immunity doc-
trine.  Since that time, the Court now has one former trial judge, Justice Sotomayor, who
has at least demonstrated more sensitivity to the fact-dependent nature of some immunity
decisions. See Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1281–82 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL505.txt unknown Seq: 16 30-JUL-18 14:42
1952 notre dame law review [vol. 93:5
a federal district judge what he or she thinks about qualified immunity and
most will respond with a chuckle or an eye roll.
A. Developing Coherent Summary Judgment Procedures I—The Discovery Problem
Recall that in Harlow, the Supreme Court suggested that the proper way
to dispose of qualified immunity claims was for defendants to move for sum-
mary judgment.  The Court stated that the trial judge could easily dispose of
the case on summary judgment because “[i]f the law at that time was not
clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate
subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to ‘know’ that the
law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.”58  Conversely,
“[i]f the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should
fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law gov-
erning his conduct.”59
As discussed previously, however, the question of whether an official vio-
lated someone’s clearly established constitutional rights can almost never be
answered in a factual vacuum.  Whatever the existing precedent holds, it typi-
cally must be applied to some version of the facts.  If the Court directed these
decisions to be made on the pleadings, then the relevant set of facts would be
the ones presented by the plaintiff, and the resolution could take place on a
motion to dismiss.60  But when cases are disputed on summary judgment, the
parties ordinarily have gathered evidence that can be presented to the trial
court in a form that, for the moving party, must demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.61  As previously discussed, however, the Court
directed from early on in the evolution of qualified immunity law that
“[u]ntil this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be
allowed.”62
As I have discussed at greater length in previous work, some sort of dis-
covery is essential before resolving most qualified immunity claims.63
Indeed, the Court started to somewhat relax its categorical bar to discovery in
qualified immunity cases in Anderson v. Creighton.  There, the Court seemed
to embrace a two-step approach, one on the pleadings, without discovery,
and one on summary judgment, with some discovery when the parties’
58 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
59 Id. at 818–19.
60 Courts must accept as true the plaintiff’s factual allegations when resolving a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002), though those facts must be more than con-
clusory and must state a claim that is “plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
61 The typical summary judgment procedure presumes that the parties have con-
ducted discovery, which as discussed below, the Court discourages.
62 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.  The Court has consistently reemphasized that one of the
goals of qualified immunity is to protect public officials from having to undergo discovery.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2009).
63 See Chen, supra note 39.
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accounts conflict.64  Of course, the parties’ accounts of the facts are fre-
quently going to differ, which suggests that discovery will often be required,
and necessarily permitted.  Reviewing lower-court decisions on this question
reveals that discovery is not uncommon.65
Although under Anderson any discovery allowed must pertain to the qual-
ified immunity issue and not to other aspects of the case, because immunity is
intertwined with the merits question, the scope of discovery is likely to be
pretty similar to what it would look like if there were discovery on the mer-
its.66  Thus, any efficiencies gained by the Court’s procedural model likely
are unrealized in most cases.  If discovery is conducted in most qualified
immunity disputes, there will unavoidably be substantial costs.67
My larger point is that this outcome is substantially directed by the juris-
prudential choices discussed in the previous part.  First, the articulation of
the qualified immunity test as a standard rather than a rule makes the inquiry
highly individualized and fact specific.  “Reasonableness tests are the epitome
of open-ended, context-sensitive legal directives.”68  The qualified immunity
reasonable official analysis therefore enhances the chance that discovery will
be required.  In contrast, absolute immunity determinations, which follow a
more rule-like structure, are frequently adjudicated without discovery.69
Thus, in important ways, defining qualified immunity as a standard was at
cross-purposes with the Court’s desire to allow rapid and early disposition of
constitutional tort claims.
64 As Justice Scalia wrote:
[I]t should first be determined whether the actions the Creightons allege Ander-
son to have taken are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful.
If they are, then Anderson is entitled to dismissal prior to discovery.  If they are
not, and if the actions Anderson claims he took are different from those the
Creightons allege (and are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed
lawful), then discovery may be necessary before Anderson’s motion for summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds can be resolved.  Of course, any such
discovery should be tailored specifically to the question of Anderson’s qualified
immunity.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (citation omitted).
65 See, e.g., Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1196 (10th Cir. 2014) (remanding quali-
fied immunity claim for discovery necessary to develop facts to be considered in substantive
constitutional balancing test).
66 If there are other issues in the case that relate not to the merits but to other ques-
tions, such as whether the government may be held liable as an entity under Monell, discov-
ery on those issues may in some circumstances be barred until the immunity question is
resolved. See Clarett v. Suroviak, No. 09 C 6918, 2011 WL 37838, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3,
2011).
67 It is possible, as the anecdotal evidence collected by Professor Blum from her inter-
views of defense attorneys suggests, that qualified immunity at least limits discovery costs
even if it does not eliminate them.  Blum, supra note 16, at 1888 n.23.  Because the immu- R
nity and merits questions are completely intertwined, however, there must be limits to this
effect.
68 Chen, supra note 28, at 291.
69 Chen, supra note 46, at 235–36.
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In contrast, the Court’s framing of qualified immunity as a pure ques-
tion of law is designed to permit prompt resolution on summary judgment
without discovery.  The problem with this is that, as previously argued, as
much as the Court calls qualified immunity a pure legal determination, it
cannot magically make that so.  As the Court began to reluctantly acknowl-
edge in Anderson, many, if not most, qualified immunity issues will turn on
factual questions, which will require discovery.
Finally, the narrower the level of generality at which the relevant consti-
tutional right is stated, the more likely discovery will be necessary.  If immu-
nity claims were measured against a more general set of principles
established by precedents, there would be less need for more specific factual
development in the current case.  But as discussed above, narrow framing of
the relevant precedent increases the importance of factual congruity—
whether a reasonable official would recognize that her conduct violates
clearly established constitutional law is highly determined by comparing the
facts of her scenario to the facts of the relevant cases that define the scope of
that right.
Thus, the manner in which the Court has structured the doctrine is in
direct tension with its desire to avoid or minimize the amount of discovery
involved.
B. Developing Coherent Summary Judgment Procedures II—Burdens of Persuasion
Virtually compelling the need for discovery is not the only paradoxical
procedural outcome produced by the Court’s doctrinal choices about quali-
fied immunity.  As some scholars have pointed out, another widely over-
looked reason the qualified immunity doctrine is extremely complex is that it
does not account for the fact that the appropriate summary judgment proce-
dure is dependent on which party bears the burden of persuasion on the
relevant factual issues.70  But fully comprehending this problem first requires
taking a step back.
The Court has described qualified immunity as an affirmative defense.71
Like other affirmative defenses, then, qualified immunity can be waived.72  In
describing the appropriate procedure for resolution of qualified immunity
defenses, however, the most the Court has said is that the defendant bears
the burden of pleading qualified immunity.73  Civil procedure law, however,
requires that in adjudicating a summary judgment motion, the trial court
must first determine which party would bear the burden of persuasion at trial
70 Chen, supra note 39, at 57; David J. Ignall, Making Sense of Qualified Immunity: Sum-
mary Judgment and Issues for the Trier of Fact, 30 CAL. W. L. REV. 201, 207 (1994); Kinports,
supra note 23, at 634–42; Teressa E. Ravenell, Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should
Look Beyond Summary Judgment When Resolving § 1983 Qualified Immunity Disputes, 52 VILL. L.
REV. 135, 136 (2007).
71 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
72 Id. (“It is for the official to claim that his conduct was justified by an objectively
reasonable belief that it was lawful.”).
73 Id. at 640–41.
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on the facts underlying the relevant legal claim (that is, the claim on which
summary judgment is sought).74  If the moving party bears the burden of
persuasion, one standard applies; if the moving party is seeking summary
judgment on a legal claim for which the nonmoving party bears the burden
of persuasion, a very different procedural standard applies.75  With most
affirmative defenses, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion with
regard to material facts necessary to prove that defense.76  If that defendant
moves for summary judgment on the basis of that defense, she must
demonstrate that even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff on the [affirmative
defense].  Because the relevant burdens of persuasion are allocated differ-
ently, the defendant’s burden is much higher to achieve summary judgment
on an affirmative defense than it is simply to defeat the plaintiff’s case-in-
chief.  Because most conventional affirmative defenses generally involve a
factual component, the burdens of persuasion and the associated burdens
on summary judgment would be similar in other contexts as well.77
The allocation of these evidentiary burdens on summary judgment are
well understood in the context of typical causes of action and affirmative
defenses.78  But if we have learned anything, it is that qualified immunity is
not a typical defense.  Once again, the doctrinal choices the Court has made
about the doctrine’s articulation place qualified immunity on a collision
course with the law of civil procedure, and to experienced practitioners and
judges, with common sense.
First, once again, because qualified immunity is articulated as an open-
ended reasonableness standard, its application is highly likely to be fact
bound.  To the extent it is fact bound, the parties would have to present to
the trial court their competing versions of the facts in a manner that
advances their legal claims.  But unlike other affirmative defenses, the identi-
cal facts are likely to be relevant both to the plaintiff’s constitutional tort
claim and the defendant’s qualified immunity claim.  Thus, to proceed on
the case-in-chief in a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, the plaintiff’s
case will turn on whether she can bear the burden of persuasion of demon-
strating that the officer’s conduct violated the standard established in Gra-
ham v. Connor.79 Graham requires application of a general reasonableness
standard that considers “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of
each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
74 Chen, supra note 39, at 57.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 94–95.
77 Id.
78 Id. (describing how summary judgment procedure burdens apply to a run-of-the-
mill common-law battery claim).
79 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
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whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.”80
The defendant’s qualified immunity defense (as well as the merits
defense) will turn on these exact same facts, though through the lens of
whether the officer’s conduct violated “clearly established” rights under the
Graham standard and its subsequent interpretations by other courts.  If the
defendant bears the burden of persuasion on proving the facts underlying
the qualified immunity claim, as stated above, that defendant would have to
demonstrate that “viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff, no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff” on the qualified immunity
defense.81
Rather than addressing this admittedly difficult procedural question, the
Supreme Court has never resolved this issue in the almost thirty-five years
since it directed courts to use summary judgment to resolve qualified immu-
nity claims.  Legal scholars have called upon the Court to clarify these bur-
dens for nearly a generation.  Indeed, Professor Kit Kinports identified the
burden of persuasion issue as one of qualified immunity’s “unanswered ques-
tions” in 1989, yet the Court has still mysteriously not heeded that call.82
Perhaps this is so because it is simply too hard—because the doctrine is fun-
damentally confusing on this point.83
Thus, instead of addressing this dilemma, the Court has chosen to avoid
it through its own doctrinal moves.  As I have previously argued, one move
might simply be to distort summary judgment burdens; to effectively hammer
a square peg into a round hole.84
Another way the Court has found to elude confronting this relatively
basic question of summary judgment procedure is by assuming away the facts.
Unlike other affirmative defenses, which are ordinarily at least partly based
80 Id. at 396.  As Professor Blum points out, excessive force claims under the Graham
standard have presented particularly thorny qualified immunity issues.  Blum, supra note
16, at xx; see also Kathryn R. Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Qualified Immu- R
nity in Section 1983 Actions for a Police Officer’s Use of Excessive Force, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 61
(1989) (discussing similar problems before Graham was decided).
81 Chen, supra note 39, at 95.
82 Kinports, supra note 23.
83 As Professor Alexander Reinert has pointed out in his contribution to this issue, an
increasing number of lower courts have attempted to address the burden of persuasion
issue, though primarily in the actual trial context.  Alexander A. Reinert, Qualified Immunity
at Trial, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065 (2018).  This still leaves open the question of how
such burdens should work when translated to the summary judgment context.
84 Chen, supra note 39, at 86 & n.540 (arguing that lower courts’ distortion of sum-
mary judgment burdens in qualified immunity cases conflicts with conventional under-
standing that summary judgment procedures are transsubstantive); see also Blum, supra
note 16, at 1918–19 (noting that “[b]oth trial and appellate courts, as well as the Supreme R
Court itself, continue to ignore the ordinary rules of summary judgment when deciding or
reviewing motions based on qualified immunity”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Essay, Disaggregating
Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 287–88 (2000) (“In effect, the [Harlow] Court
adopted a special rule of summary judgment to take account of the peculiar litigation
incentives in constitutional tort cases.”).
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on critical factual assertions, qualified immunity is, at least nominally, a ques-
tion of law.85  Thus, the Court’s pronouncement that qualified immunity is a
pure legal question can be viewed as a way of escaping its responsibility to
clarify the procedural technicalities in this field.  And by overlooking the fact-
bound nature of the defense, it also gives latitude to lower courts to circum-
vent ordinary summary judgment procedure.
If qualified immunity were truly a pure legal question, then judges need
not bother with the intricate details of summary judgment procedure.
Indeed, as I have written about extensively, evidentiary burdens do not even
make sense in the context of adjudication of a supposedly purely legal ques-
tion.86  But no matter what the Court calls qualified immunity, it is a defense
that almost always turns on some questions of fact.  Once that is conceded, as
it must be, summary judgment cannot be applied properly without determin-
ing which party bears the burden of persuasion on immunity-related facts.
This is a fundamental gap in the doctrine and many courts simply gloss over
its resolution, if they even notice it at all.87  For if the Court were to recognize
qualified immunity as a mixed question of law and fact, it would have to
confront the still unresolved issue of evidentiary burdens.  As long as it main-
tains its own blinders on the role of facts, however, the Court will never see
the need to allocate burdens in a coherent manner.
Finally, the Court’s attempt to define the level of generality at which a
clearly established constitutional right must be articulated also contributes to
the problems in identifying the appropriate evidentiary burdens under quali-
fied immunity.  Again, the narrower the level of generality at which the law
requires the articulation of constitutional rights, the more likely the issue is
to be fact sensitive; the more likely the issue is fact sensitive, the more it must
be viewed as at least a mixed question of law and fact.  And if qualified immu-
nity is a mixed question, then facts must be considered on summary judg-
ment, requiring the formal assignment of evidentiary burdens.
C. Qualified Immunity’s Costs
Qualified immunity is putatively designed to reduce the significant social
costs associated with constitutional tort claims against public officials.  As the
Court asserted in Harlow:
[I]t cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the inno-
cent as well as the guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to
society as a whole.  These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the
85 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
86 Chen, supra note 39, at 91 (criticizing lower courts for failing to “acknowledge that a
burden of persuasion on a question of law may be nonsensical”).
87 See, e.g., Sheets v. Mullins, 287 F.3d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 2002) (appearing to assign
burden of proof on factual issues relating to qualified immunity claim to the plaintiff);
Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1989) (appearing to assign burden
of “proof” to the defendant on legal elements of qualified immunity claim).
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diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence
of able citizens from acceptance of public office.88
Thus, the Court’s emphasis on procedures that facilitated early termina-
tion of such litigation was driven by its supposition both that frivolous claims
are frequent, and that the attendant tangible and intangible costs of civil
rights litigation are substantial.
As illustrated in the previous Parts, however, the goal of early and easy
disposition of these claims must be contrasted with reality.  The Court has
developed a doctrine that, in fact, entails a set of pretrial procedures that
often necessarily requires fairly involved discovery and insufficiently clear
summary judgment rules that are actually nonsensical in the context of what
is really a mixed question of law and fact. These doctrinal choices have
accordingly resulted in a process under which litigation of qualified immu-
nity claims, rather than the cases’ merits, has become the main event of con-
stitutional tort litigation.  While there is no single, systematic, statistical
account of the amount of qualified immunity litigation, attempts to measure
its frequency suggest the tentative conclusion that it consumes an enormous
amount of resources from parties, courts, and society.89 It is certainly possi-
ble that, on balance, more defendants still prevail on summary judgment,
thus saving substantial trial costs, but it is equally likely that the administra-
tion of the immunity defense itself imposes substantial costs on the parties,
the courts, and society.90  The accurate assessment of the value of qualified
immunity must account for the relative, rather than absolute, cost savings to
defendants.
This creates a host of what I have called “secondary burdens” that are
produced by qualified immunity, rather than alleviated because of it.91
Assessing the extent of these burdens’ costs relative to any costs saved by
pretrial granting of qualified immunity claims would be an important step in
assessing whether the doctrine actually serves the goals that the Court insists
it achieves.  But perhaps the hope that empirical evidence will influence the
Court’s decisions in this area is overly optimistic, as I address in the next Part.
The realization of qualified immunity’s costs might be worth it if there
were a comparable systemic benefit to the defense.  One such benefit might
be the shaping of substantive constitutional doctrine through judicial deci-
sions, as the Court once required in Saucier v. Katz.92  There, the Court
directed lower courts adjudicating qualified immunity claims to first decide
88 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (footnote omitted).
89 See id.
90 Indeed, some empirical research into these costs would be greatly beneficial to
enhancing our understanding of qualified immunity’s effectiveness. But see infra Part V
(arguing that the Court is not likely to be receptive to empirical data on reforming the
doctrine).
91 Chen, supra note 39, at 99 (defining secondary burdens as “the social costs specifi-
cally generated by the litigation of the qualified immunity defense”).  For a much more
detailed account of the secondary burdens thesis, see id. at 98–103.
92 533 U.S. 194 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
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whether a defendant violated a constitutional right (the merits question)
before deciding that a defendant was nonetheless entitled to qualified immu-
nity because that right was not clearly established at the time of his con-
duct.93  In this manner, the Court suggested, substantive constitutional
doctrine would evolve without burdening public officials, because those deci-
sions would stand as precedent on the merits question even while dismissing
the suit on the immunity question.94  Because the Court has now abandoned
the so-called order-of-battle requirement, that advantage no longer exists, or
at least does not occur as frequently.95
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE DIM PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
Thus far, I have examined qualified immunity from a purely internal
perspective.96  My critique of the law assumes that the Court’s claims about
the policy goals of promoting fairness for public officials, minimizing
overdeterrence of socially useful official conduct, and reducing the social
costs produced by constitutional tort litigation are at least plausible reasons
for denying plaintiffs the opportunity to litigate their civil rights claims on
the merits.  Instead, I have focused on the notion that the Court’s implemen-
tation of qualified immunity through its decisions, to a large degree, creates a
jurisprudentially confusing set of principles while simultaneously impeding
the prompt resolution of claims (and perhaps even prolonging the litigation
of constitutional tort claims) that the Court has always promised.  Given
these doctrinal and procedural problems, there is good reason to believe that
qualified immunity needs serious reconsideration.
But as I have already suggested, the problems I have identified are
deeply embedded in the doctrine’s structure and inherent in the Court’s
desire that this type of immunity be “qualified.”  For instance, there is no way
to convert qualified immunity into a legitimately pure legal question without
completely and radically altering what we mean by rights—that is, rights
could only exist in the abstract, not in the instantiations of particular dis-
93 Id. at 207–08.
94 See id.  This assumes that such a merits decision would not be an unconstitutional
advisory opinion. Compare Chen, supra note 46, at 257 n.173 (raising serious questions
about this problem), and Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83
N.C. L. REV. 847, 920 (2005) (raising serious concerns about this problem of advisory opin-
ions), with John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional Rul-
ings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (1999), and Sam Kamin, An
Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability
of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 53 (2008).
95 See Pearson, 555 U.S. 223.  Assessing the relative value of the Saucier order-of-battle
requirement and the post-Pearson regime, however, assumes that lower courts adhered
strictly to the Saucier requirement in the years between those two decisions.  Some have
observed skepticism about whether lower courts did so.  Even when Saucier was the law,
there is some evidence that lower courts failed to strictly adhere to the merits-first rule. See
generally Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36
PEPP. L. REV. 667 (2009).
96 See supra text accompanying notes 17–20. R
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putes.  But classifying qualified immunity as a legal question butts up against
the levels-of-generality problem, for only rights defined at the highest level of
generality can be completely devoid of factual nuance.
Perhaps we could break out of this dilemma if there were sound policy
reasons either to depart from or stick to this structure.  In this final Part, I
address some of the reasons that reform is unlikely to be forthcoming, mak-
ing the previously identified problems not only doctrinally intractable, but
institutionally resistant to change.
A. Epistemological Problems—The Promise and Limits of Empirical Research
Legal scholars have pointed out for decades that the Court built quali-
fied immunity doctrine around a set of assumptions about the behavior of
public officials in anticipation of the potential exposure to constitutional tort
suits that is without any empirical foundation.97  Thus, for example, the
notion that, in the absence of qualified immunity, public officials will be chil-
led in their behavior such that they will not perform their duties even where
it would be beneficial to do so, is based on a number of assumptions, includ-
ing that: such officials know about their potential exposure to litigation; they
are similarly aware that qualified immunity will provide them with broad pro-
tection; the availability of (and knowledge about) a government-funded
defense lawyer and indemnification for liability would not alter their calcula-
tions; and their sense of civic duty or the need to act during a short time
frame would not override any of these concerns.
Perhaps public officials think about liability and lawsuits, perhaps they
do not.  Perhaps even if they think about it, it does not alter their behavior.
We now know that at least police officers are widely indemnified,98 and if
that is true for other public officials, maybe that is enough to ensure that
officials may act freely.99  But maybe constitutional tort suits burden public
officials not solely because of the prospect of monetary liability, but because
of the psychological burdens of litigation and the related fear that their pro-
fessional reputations may be damaged even if they win and even if the gov-
ernment pays if they lose.  The prospect of defending a lawsuit, whether
frivolous or well founded, probably seems highly unappealing to the average
person.100
97 Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of
Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 94–97 (1989); Fallon, supra note 14, at 500; Gary S. Gildin,
Immunizing Intentional Violations of Constitutional Rights Through Judicial Legislation: The Exten-
sion of Harlow v. Fitzgerald to Section 1983 Actions, 38 EMORY L.J. 369, 389–90 & nn.89–90
(1989); Nahmod, supra note 23, at 248; Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court,
Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 281, 282.
98 Schwartz, supra note 38.
99 Cf. Fallon, supra note 14, at 496.
100 Schuck, supra note 97, at 285–86.  Whether the foreseeability of such suits against
public officials is higher than with private citizens, and whether that has an effect on that
concern one way or the other, is also an open question.
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These sorts of epistemological questions seem to be a substantial barrier
to engaging with any meaningful reform.  Empirical data, therefore, is one
way out of the intractable doctrinal and procedural problems of qualified
immunity, at least in theory.  I think it is indisputable that more empirical
data about several constitutional remedies questions could lead to a better
understanding about the optimal rights enforcement regime.
And there may be some hope.  A number of legal scholars have engaged
in empirical research about qualified immunity in recent years, substantially
enriching the body of knowledge about the doctrine’s implementation.
Much of the available empirical work has focused on the implications of the
Saucier order-of-battle issue discussed above.  Professor Nancy Leong, for
example, carefully studied whether the Saucier regime promoted more deci-
sionmaking on substantive constitutional law (which was the Court’s explicit
goal), concluding that while courts did decide the merits question first in
many cases, thereby “creating” more precedent, they tended to narrow rather
than expand substantive constitutional doctrine.101  Two other studies con-
ducted and published by law students also focused on federal court decisions
to examine the impact of the Saucier regime, reaching conclusions that dif-
fered from Professor Leong’s and each other’s.102  More recently, Professors
Aaron Nielson and Chris Walker studied the impact of Pearson’s overruling of
Saucier, concluding among other things that allowing district courts discre-
tion to decide the merits issue or the immunity issue first may have a stagnat-
ing function impeding the development of constitutional law, may distribute
law-pronouncing influence unevenly in favor of circuits whose judges more
frequently decide the merits question first, and may have an asymmetric
effect on constitutional doctrine because of the overlap between judges’
ideologies.103
In addition to these studies, Professor Joanna Schwartz’s excellent work
has examined the scope of government indemnification of police officers
and determined that it is nearly universal.104  If the same could be shown for
other public officials who are frequently sued for constitutional torts, it could
substantially influence our thinking about the necessity for official immu-
nity.105  In a more recent paper, Professor Schwartz has reported that, based
on data from her examination of 1183 § 1983 cases in five different federal
districts, qualified immunity rarely serves its asserted purpose of early termi-
101 Leong, supra note 95.
102 See Leong, supra note 95, at 69 (finding that qualified immunity was denied in 14%
to 32% of cases studied); Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of
Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 523, 545 (2010) (finding that qualified immunity was denied in only 32% of cases
studied).
103 See Nielson & Walker, supra note 24, at 6.
104 Schwartz, supra note 38, at 946–47.
105 Cf. Fallon, supra note 14, at 496. R
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nation of civil rights cases.106  She found that among the cases in her data set,
“just 3.9% of the cases in which qualified immunity could be raised were
dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.”107  These findings conflict with
the work of some other scholars, who found public officials’ success on quali-
fied immunity claims to be significantly higher.108
Using my own prior work as a test case, we can see that, assuming the
published findings are valid, empirical data can both contradict non-empiri-
cally-based assumptions and validate them.  The work of those who have con-
cluded that a substantial percentage of cases are dismissed on qualified
immunity calls into question my earlier claims that the defense frequently
does not serve the Supreme Court’s goals of early termination.109  More posi-
tively (for me), Professor Schwartz’s work appears to validate, at least anec-
dotally, my prior assertions that dismissal of qualified immunity claims should
be difficult because the doctrine requires “inherently . . . nuanced, fact-sensi-
tive, case-by-case determinations involving the application of general legal
principles to a particular context.”110  Her data found that “courts repeatedly
found that factual disputes prevented summary judgment on qualified immu-
nity grounds.”111  The point here is neither to diminish nor glorify my own
scholarship, but to suggest that empirical data can make the work of both
courts and scholars better.  The Supreme Court’s assertions about human
behavior should be no less vulnerable to empirical challenge.
Notwithstanding cause for optimism with the emergence of empirical
work, there are also reasons to believe that such work has important limits.
First, some of the most foundational questions about the effect of immunity
remain unstudied, and therefore unanswered.  As mentioned above, we still
have no data on the costs of constitutional tort suits compared to the costs of
litigation over qualified immunity, but there is no obvious way to approach
106 Schwartz, supra note 24, at 9 (noting that recently, the Court’s justification for the
qualified immunity doctrine has been to “protect government officials from nonfinancial
burdens associated with discovery and trial”).
107 Id. at 10.
108 See Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123, 146
(1999); Leong, supra note 95, at 690; Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 102, at 551. But see
Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the
Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 845 (2010).
109 Hassel, supra note 108; Leong, supra note 95, Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 102.
110 Chen, supra note 46, at 230.
111 Schwartz, supra note 24, at 54 & n.132.  In a recent case, the Ninth Circuit held that
the dispute over the facts underlying the defendant’s immunity claim were so sharp that
the case must go to trial—an ironic result given that immunity’s role is to facilitate early
disposition. See Hughes v. Kisela, 862 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, rev’d, and
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam).  As observed by Justice Sotomayor in her
dissent, the Supreme Court’s summary reversal of that decision appears to conflict with
ordinary summary judgment principles. Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1155 (“Viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to Hughes, as the Court must at summary judgment, a jury could find
that Kisela violated Hughes’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by needlessly
resorting to lethal force.  In holding otherwise, the Court misapprehends the facts and
misapplies the law, effectively treating qualified immunity as an absolute shield.”).
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an empirical project to examine this.  There is still only limited evidence
about public officials’ understanding of the constitutional limits on their
authority, awareness about constitutional tort suits, and knowledge of both
immunity and indemnification.112  One barrier may be that it would be both
difficult and expensive to gather the necessary data.  Another impediment
might be that even empirical evidence about these questions may not be uni-
versally applicable.  For example, police officers may have different levels of
knowledge and awareness about all these issues than, say, school board
members.113
A distinct challenge to empirical research on qualified immunity is that
some questions may be unanswerable or unsusceptible to study because the
data are unavailable or unable to be gathered.  The best example of a ques-
tion that is important but difficult to study is the number of constitutional
tort claims that are not filed because of skepticism about the difficulty of
overcoming qualified immunity or concerns about the increased litigation
costs associated with what is likely to be a protracted battle over immunity,
including time-consuming interlocutory appeals even if the defense is
defeated initially.  Although there has been some preliminary work examin-
ing this question, it is thus far anecdotal rather than systemic.114  That is, we
can only fully understand qualified immunity’s effectiveness if we know how
close it comes to actually accomplishing the balance between rights enforce-
ment and burdens on public officials.  Perhaps my thoughts about the value
added of future empirical research are far too cynical, and as Professor
Schwartz has suggested, we should not allow the perfect to be the enemy of
the good in this realm of policy assessment.115  But that does not mean that
these are not serious limitations.
A third problem with empirical data is whether, even if available, it will
be a useful tool for reform.  To be meaningful, it must be incorporated into
decisionmaking either by the Supreme Court or by Congress.  If neither insti-
tution takes such data seriously or uses it to implement reform, the prospects
for substantial modification of qualified immunity remain low.  I address
these concerns in the final two subsections.
B. Problems of Institutional Competence
Even assuming the research community could compile a robust set of
data on many of the important questions about qualified immunity, it is far
from clear that such data would be embraced by the Supreme Court as a
112 But see Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1797, 1819 n.138 (2018) (citing to studies).
113 Cf. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
114 Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477
(2011) (reporting that some plaintiffs’ attorneys have decided not to pursue claims
because of the anticipation of qualified immunity defenses).  Professor Schwartz has also
begun studying qualified immunity’s effect on attorneys’ case selection. See Schwartz, supra
note 112, at 1831–32.
115 Schwartz, supra note 24, at 76.
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basis for reforming the doctrine.  First, the Court might question the reliabil-
ity of any data presented to it, which would likely be in the form of empirical
evidence introduced in the trial court proceedings by the plaintiff’s counsel
or, more likely, through its presentation in amicus briefs.  Without an inde-
pendent way to validate the empirical data, the Court might be skeptical
about its value and unpersuaded because it believes the data are skewed
through advocacy.  The Supreme Court is not, and does not represent itself
to be, a peer reviewer of academic studies.  At the same time, when it relies
on data provided, say, in an advocacy group’s amicus brief, it might be impor-
tant for reasons of institutional legitimacy to do some validation of the
information.116
Second, the Court might conclude that data is more appropriately
viewed as a “legislative fact” than a judicial one, and that such evidence is
better directed at Congress to support legislative reform.117  Indeed, there
are legitimate arguments to suggest that the policy of civil rights remedies
should be addressed through legislative reform rather than judicial decision.
The Court’s development of qualified immunity can be criticized as entirely
policy based,118 and therefore more susceptible to legislative debate.
Finally, even if the Court were to accept the validity of empirical studies,
it is possible that it will misconstrue or misinterpret the data.  And this is a
legitimate concern without regard to normative positions about how quali-
fied immunity should be modified.  As a recent study by the investigative
journalism website ProPublica found, even when the Court relies on empirical
data—data that may profoundly shape its decisions and holdings—it some-
times relies on data that are inaccurate.119  There are certainly other
instances in which the Court has relied on studies or data that raise serious
questions about its capacity to objectively assess the implications of such data
on its decisionmaking.120  This is perhaps not so much a critique of the insti-
116 Building on an older proposal by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis that the Supreme
Court create an institutional equivalent of the Congressional Research Service, Professor
John Pfaff recently suggested that the Justices ought to have a group of technical advisors
to help them better understand empirical evidence.  John Pfaff, Opinion, The Supreme
Court Justices Need Fact-Checkers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/18/opinion/supreme-court-justices-factcheckers.html.  To review Professor
Davis’s original proposal, see Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative
Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1986).
117 See Davis, supra note 116.
118 See Chen, supra note 46, at 267.
119 Ryan Gabrielson, It’s a Fact: Supreme Court Errors Aren’t Hard to Find, PROPUBLICA
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/supreme-court-errors-are-not-hard-to-
find.
120 Compare Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101–02 (1970) (relying on studies sug-
gesting that varying the size of juries does not alter juries’ capacity to serve their critical
functions as a basis for rejecting a defendant’s claim that the Sixth Amendment requires
twelve-member juries), with Alisa Smith & Michael J. Saks, The Case for Overturning Williams
v. Florida and the Six-Person Jury: History, Law, and Empirical Evidence, 60 FLA. L. REV. 441,
463–68 (2008) (summarizing empirical research that contradicts the information that the
Court relied on in Williams).
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tution as it is an argument that there are limits to the value of empirical data
as an influencer of Supreme Court decisionmaking.
This is not to say that all sound legal decisionmaking, whether by the
courts or legislatures, must have irrebuttable factual support.  Indeed, as the
Court once candidly acknowledged, “[f]rom the beginning of civilized socie-
ties, legislators and judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions.”121
While it seems like that proposition should not apply where there are prova-
ble assumptions, the Court’s ability or willingness to consume and incorpo-
rate empirical research may be somewhat limited.
C. Lack of Political Will
Finally, to the extent that remedial reform for constitutional enforce-
ment ought to originate in the legislature rather than the Court,122 there are
structural and political impediments that diminish the prospect of any sort of
meaningful legislative reform concerning qualified immunity.  Thus, even if
there existed an empirically-based path to reform, it is unclear that the availa-
bility of such data would compel Congress to amend § 1983 or codify a Bivens
cause of action that would substantially modify the currently available scope
of immunity.
Notwithstanding the proliferation of high-profile police shootings, par-
ticularly of unarmed African-American men in recent years,123 amendments
to civil rights laws are unlikely to be on the radar of lawmakers of either
major political party.  First, there is not much historical evidence that Con-
gress pays that much attention to the major civil rights statute under which
constitutional tort claims are brought, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.124  There have been
only two material changes to § 1983 since its enactment, one to add liability
to officers acting under color of District of Columbia law,125 and one to
essentially codify absolute judicial immunity.126  There have occasionally
been efforts to amend § 1983 to extend respondeat superior liability to local
government units when their agents or employees violate the Constitution,
but none have succeeded.127
121 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973).
122 See Gary S. Gildin, The Supreme Court’s Legislative Agenda to Free Government from
Accountability for Constitutional Deprivations, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1333, 1383 (2010) (criticiz-
ing the Court’s decisions limiting official liability for constitutional violations as exceeding
its judicial role and treading into areas that are more appropriately addressed by
Congress).
123 Jacqueline Howard, Black Men Nearly 3 Times as Likely to Die from Police Use of Force,
Study Says, CNN (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/20/health/black-men-
killed-by-police/index.html.
124 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
125 Act of December 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96–170, 93 Stat. 1284.
126 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–317, § 309(c), 110 Stat.
3847, 3853.
127 See, e.g., Civil Rights Improvements Act of 1977, S. 35, 95th Cong. (1977).
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Second, measures to expand federal civil rights law tend to be highly
controversial, with beneficiaries likely to be diffuse and lacking in resources
and opponents having both strong incentives to oppose such amendments
and interest groups with the resources to readily mobilize their constituen-
cies.128  Typically, where there is no natural constituency to organize around,
or where the benefits of such organization are small to any one member of
that constituency, it is harder to mobilize support.  Civil rights plaintiffs are
not a natural constituency in the same way as other identity groups, and
indeed, one might not anticipate being interested in the plight of civil rights
plaintiffs until an event occurs that violates one’s rights.  Thus, it is harder to
pressure politicians to take action to benefit a large, but diffuse, group of
people.129  There have, of course, been critical exceptions to this,130 and per-
haps I am far too cynical about the prospects for legislative refinement of
qualified immunity, but the historical record and the general understanding
about interest group politics suggest that this is probably the case.131
But perhaps the biggest impediment to statutory civil rights reform is a
nonlegal one.  Elected officials are simply unlikely to have the political will to
move important expansive civil rights legislation through Congress.  And this
is not true only in the present political climate.  Coupled with the challenges
to organizing efforts for such reform to pressure legislators to address the
problem, these political impediments leave little hope that qualified immu-
nity’s problems will be addressed through the legislative process.
* * *
Before concluding, a couple of reasonable limitations of this Essay’s
arguments should be acknowledged and addressed.  First, as discussed ear-
lier, the claims presented here, especially those in Parts II and III, are wholly
internal critiques.  None of the discussion here focuses on any other aspect
of constitutional enforcement other than damages actions against public offi-
cials, which can be an overly narrow way to examine the broader structure of
rights.132  One response to this is that I am not suggesting that qualified
immunity’s many flaws necessarily lead to the conclusion that the larger con-
stitutional rights regime is insufficiently robust.  It can be conceded that
other mechanisms for enforcing those rights are more important or more
effective than constitutional torts without diminishing my internal critique.
Qualified immunity is self-contradictory and problematic even if other
aspects of the rights enforcement scheme are effective.  At most, this poten-
tial critique suggests that my claims are incomplete, not that they are wrong.
128 ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE (2013).
129 See id.
130 Id. at 260–61 (discussing advocacy behind the successful enactment of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act).
131 For a much more optimistic view of the possibilities of congressional reform of
§ 1983, see Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Congress Needs to Repair the Court’s Damage to § 1983, 16
TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 29 (2010).
132 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Second, my thesis is based on what I identify as three central dichoto-
mies within qualified immunity doctrine—the choice between an immunity
rule and an immunity standard; the characterization of immunity as a ques-
tion of law or a mixed question of law and fact; and the decision to frame a
preexisting right at broad or narrow levels of generality.  Each of these ques-
tions could easily and fairly be said to lie on a continuum, rather than to be
pure binary choices, something I expressly recognized in the levels-of-gener-
ality discussion.  The articulation of legal directives can, of course, be more
rule-like and more standard-like, but I do not believe this undermines my
more basic point, which is that the more standard-like the articulation of
immunity, the more difficult it is to implement in the manner that the
Supreme Court has directed.  The matter of pure legal questions versus
mixed questions, I believe, is a little more binary.  There truly are such things
as pure legal questions (as in my peanut M&Ms example, above).  Within
what we might call mixed questions of law and fact, however, there is cer-
tainly a range of how many factual questions are involved.133  In any event,
this does not rebut my main point, which is that facts are embedded in most
qualified immunity determinations, which makes summary judgment, prop-
erly understood, an unlikely vehicle for pretrial resolution.  So, too, with my
argument about levels of generality.  Even if these lie on a continuum for
each constitutional right, the narrower the level of generality, the more fact-
bound the immunity determination.
A critique that is perhaps somewhat harder to address is that in my effort
to expose qualified immunity’s fundamental tensions, I am asking too much.
No legal regime or set of doctrinal tools is perfect.  It could be said that
qualified immunity is simply an imperfect mechanism created by the Court to
accomplish a greater social good, which is to allow public officials to be held
accountable only when they engage in the most egregious types of unconsti-
tutional conduct, but otherwise freeing them to go about their work in an
uninhibited and socially productive manner.  Maybe qualified immunity is an
example of pure judicial pragmatism that can be argued to be mostly, if not
uniformly, successful on its own terms.  In response to this, I would maintain
that even accepting that we should take qualified immunity on these terms, it
is still a failure.  My claims here and in my prior work are that qualified
immunity is internally contradictory even as a pragmatic doctrine.  The
Court’s decisions shaping the basic doctrine establish a standard that is diffi-
cult to comprehend, in tension with its own explicit goals, and so burden-
some to adjudicate that it may well outweigh the benefits it seeks to achieve.
If there existed any real prospects for revision or refinement through judicial
decision or congressional action, perhaps the legal system could be freed
from qualified immunity’s tangles, but as I argue here, there do not.
133 For an extensive examination of the law/fact distinction in qualified immunity, see
Chen, supra note 46, at 264–67.
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CONCLUSION
This Essay has shown that even after decades of extensive public debate
in the pages of the federal reporters and law reviews, the challenges
presented by qualified immunity are stubbornly persistent.  The prospects for
disengaging the qualified immunity doctrine from its own theoretical and
pragmatic trappings are dim.  This is so largely because, consciously or not,
the Supreme Court has shaped the doctrine and directed lower courts to
implement it in ways that conflict with the Court’s stated objectives.  Perhaps
this is because many Justices have a limited understanding of how pretrial
litigation works at a granular level.  This might lead the Court to believe that
qualified immunity can do more than it actually can, given the constraints of
the federal civil procedure rules.
There is a great deal of path dependency at work here.  Qualified immu-
nity doctrine is shaped by the Court’s decisions about foundational jurispru-
dential questions.  Its implementation is shaped by those doctrinal choices.
The result is a doctrine that struggles under the weight of its own internal
contradictions.  And because those earlier decisions are inherent to the con-
cept of “qualified” immunity, they are intractable.  If qualified immunity doc-
trine is accordingly stuck, there are few prospects for major reforms that
might alleviate the burdens that the doctrine has created.  Empirical
research, while extremely valuable, cannot offer all the answers.  Even if it
could, there are reasons to believe that neither the Court nor Congress
would embrace such data and use it as the basis for meaningful reform.
